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I Introduction
In today official aid system, only one type of rela-
tionship seems to count. lt is called 'partnership'.
This issue of the IDS Bulletin, prepared by alumni,
takes a critical look at this relational preference. lt
does so from the perspective of non-governmental
organisations involved in third world development
(NGDOs) that are directly or indirectly related to
aid thinking, policy, practice and financing.'
This introduction concentrates on the question:
why has 'partnership' come to the fore now and
does it make sense in terms of effective develop-
ment work? The answer, in terms of both theory
and the practice illustrated in the articles to follow,
suggests that adopting partnership as a dominant
concept may be doing more harm than good in
improving system credibility and performance.
In brief, the story of partnership as pre-eminent
model for relationships in the current aid system is
one of convergence. This dynamic results from the
spill-over into the aid arena of prevailing donor
domestic policies - variations on the theme of a
reformed 'social contract'. This conceptual under-
pinning, allied to the post-Cold War impact of
globalisation on the international political econ-
omy, is creating insecurity in the continuation of
official aid. A consequence of this interplay is the
promotion of 'partnership' as the 'politically cor-
rect' mode of relating. It also reflects a defensive
institutional strategy against decline in aid levels
(Hudock in this volume) and its post-Cold War
political and instrumental importance, with the
eventual replacement of international concessional
finance by foreign direct investment (FDI). In addi-
tion, it signals the probability of deeper and wider
external penetration into the internal processes of
developing countries.
2 Relations and Partnership in
Development: A Brief History
Since the seventies, 'partnership' has been a guid-
ing idea for the quality of relationships that many
NGDOs were looking for. In its original expression,
partnership was understood as a code word reflect-
ing humanitarian, moral, political, ideological or
spiritual solidarity between NGDOs in the North
and South that joined together to pursue a com-
mon cause of social change.' It signalled an alliance
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between NGDOs of the North and South in favour
of a dependecia analysis of underdevelopment
(Lehmann 1986), set against the subsequently dis-
proven modernisation, 'lift-off and trickle-down'
approach adopted by official aid at this time.
This era was characterised by a strong emphasis on
government as the principle actor and engine of
growth and development. The task of 'nation-build-
ing' was governmental, as was the nature of inter-
national aid. Hence, inter-governmental relations
were paramount. As far as non-governmental
organisations were involved in development work,
they were tolerated as marginal contributors but
were not embraced by the official system.
Moreover, in the seventies the NGDO universe,
especially in the South, was not densely populated.
However, it was gaining ground. One cause of
growth was an influx of northern NGDOs (as role
models) in ex-colonies. Another was their emer-
gence as a domestic refuge for intellectuals or oth-
ers of the political left where military or civilian
dictatorships prevailed, as in much of Latin
America. The task of business was to contract for
aid projects, little more. The role of the private sec-
tor as the source of growth was yet to be prioritised.
Typically, NGDOs saw (transnational) corporations
as part of the problem of exploitation.
Consequently, mutual mistrust was a typical stance.
In short, until the late seventies, the relational
world of international development was essentially
split into self-contained corridors between North
and South, each inhabited by government, NGDOs
or businesses with little respect or interaction
between them.
This situation was set to change in the early eight-
ies, which marked a rightwards shift in Northern
politics - the Reagan-Thatcher era. The domestic
policies of these two moved attention from govern-
ment to the market as the engine of growth and
progress. In addition to freeing business from
restrictive shackles, a push for 'less government'
also meant more responsibility to citizens and their
organisations. Hence, the start of the rise in official
finance to, and number of, NGOs that continues
today. The spill-over of a market perspective into
international aid was spearheaded by the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWIs): the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and its sis-
ter regional development banks.
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The instrumental framework for a translation of
domestic into international policy became known
as 'structural adjustment'. lt was the start, through
more stringent and similar loan conditions, of a
growing domination of these institutions in terms of
overly uniform development policy and thinking.
Over one hundred countries have been subject to
donor-led adjustment. In effect, the dominant role
of the BWIs in shaping development agendas has
stifled choice, a search for situation-specific alterna-
tives and local ownership of development
processes.3 Redefining the motor of development
away from government to markets, however, said
nothing about the relationship between them.
Other events and forces were needed to push
towards adoption of partnership as the desired
mode.
A second impetus to relational change arose from
the implosion of the Soviet Union and the rise of
the concept of civil society as a legitimate and nec-
essary actor in society Consequently, the third sec-
tor came into its own as a recognised player that
must be associated with development goals, both as
means and ends.1 For the aid system, greater inter-
action with and dedicated efforts to enhance the
growth of civil society were necessary for two rea-
sons. One, discussed in more detail below, is to help
deal with the institutional reconfiguration required
by 'privatisation' of supposedly over-extended gov-
ernment (social) services. Another is to accelerate
the consolidation of democracy as the political
agenda of aid, especially in transition economies,
i.e., those formerly constituting the Soviet Union,
that are now implementing capitalist, free market
economic systems.
A third cause of expanded relationships with gov-
ernment came from NGDOs themselves.
Experience of having their local development efforts
undermined by ill-conceived policies and often
poor, corrupt national public management, caused
them to shift their horizons to policy formulation
and its actors at home and abroad. The result has
been growing and active NGDO pressure on and
engagement with governments, not just about pol-
icy implementation, but about policy choices them-
selves and the right of citizen participation and of
rights-based development more generally (Nelson
1995; van Tuijl 1999). Substantial citizen presence
and lobbying at the Rio summit on the environment
and demonstrations at the recent meeting of the
World Trade Organisation in Seattle are examples of
how far things have come.
Finally, alongside this aid picture, as a fourth force,
is the growth in relations beiween NGDOs and mar-
ket actors. Originally spearheaded by the environ-
mental movement, this enhanced interaction is
occurring, amongst others, under the rubrics of
developing corporate citizenship and socially
responsible business (Murphy and Bendell 1997).
Where corporations are transnational, they face
growing interaction with both Northern and
Southern NGDOs working, thanks to the internet,
more closely together than ever before. One exam-
ple of such collaboration was (boycott) pressure on
US company Nike to treat its foreign suppliers more
fairly, leading to it adopting an international code of
conduct, compliance with which is independently
monitored. There are increasing examples of these
and other forms of NGDObusiness collaboration
(Bendell 2000).
The forces sketched above have all contributed to
thirty years of relational convergence. Gone are the
separate NorthSouth sectoral corridors of the sev-
enties. They have given way to complex relational
arenas of intensive and extensive interaction
between governments, business and civic institu-
tions in the North and South around development
agendas, where the rules cf the game are being
made up on the spot. The processes are far from
transparent or stable. Also unclear is how interests
are played out for whose benefit. Particularly, what
does it all mean for people and groups that are poor
and marginalised? This issue of the bulletin con-
centrates on answers related to NGDOs and other
parts of the aid system, not with businesses.
To capture this emerging relational complexity,
exemplified by policy pronouncements from the
development assistance committee (DAC) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) the official aid system has
resorted to the term 'partnership'. In fact, partnership
is now a cornerstone of the new agenda for interna-
tional aid (OECD 1996). But what it means, how
relations are negotiated, and who wins and who
loses, when the nature of power and of power differ-
ence between parties is so divergent, is far from clear.
Today rule of thumb in international development is
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that everybody wants to be a partner with everyone
else on everything, everywhere. This is so patently
and transparently illogical, that it requires a critical
analysis typical of development studies, which is to
ask: who gains, who loses and why?
Inevitably, and to its detriment, multiple and
diverse users mean that the original idea and
premise of partnership has been stretched in many
directions and interpreted in many ways. In this
respect it has become a 'something nothing' word
(Maihotra 1997). Authentic partnership implies,
inter alla, a joint commitment to long-term interac-
tion, shared responsibility for achievement, recipro-
cal obligation, equality, mutuality and balance of
power (Fowler 1998). This is not a common rela-
tional condition in any walk of life. Just why, then,
is 'partnership' selected as the appropriate language
and modality for bringing together disparate actors
under vastly different (national) preconditions and
historical trajectories? Why not - depending on the
parties, the purpose and the nature of power truly
involved (Lister 2000) - employ terms like coun-
terpart, collaborator, contractor, ally, associate, sup-
porter, backer, benefactor, sponsor, client or patron
(Fowler 2000b)?
Illogical as it may seem at first sight, there are 'good'
reasons why this single term has gained currency, if
not credibility in the 'new' aid system. The follow-
ing section therefore sets out what is probably going
on. Drawing on other articles in this bulletin, the
final section offers an assessment of partnership as a
real relationship for NGDOs.
3 Why Partnership for Everyone,
Everything and Everywhere?
The adoption of partnership as the relational mode
of choice in aid thinking and agenda can be under-
stood from at least three perspectives. The first is a
deep-lying theory of statesociety relations as social
contracts. The second is partnership as a practical
solution to inadequate aid performance. The third
is a self-serving mystification of power asymmetry
allied to a co-optation of opposing forces in a sys-
tem of concessional resource provision that pene-
trates deeper into recipient society at the cost of a
sovereignly chosen speed of change, of of develop-
ment alternatives. This section deals with each in
turn.
3.1 Partnership as social contract
From times of Greek and Roman cultural and polit-
ical prominence, philosophers such as Plato have
been concerned about the origin and nature of
political power and of its obligations towards citi-
zens. The latter part of the sixteenth century saw
this enquiry framed (by Locke, Hobbes and others)
and later refined (Rousseau, Mill), into the liberal
democratic doctrine in terms of a 'social contract'
between rulers and the ruled. Here the initial argu-
ment was that people would accept a common
superior power to protect themselves from their
own baser instincts and enable them to fulfill
human needs and desires. But, it was subsequently
argued that a necessary legitimising condition of a
social contract was that state power derived from a
sovereign citizenry, for which the state acted as
trustee, and could be legitimately overthrown if it
failed to discharge its function to the people. This
formulation underpins the theory and principles of
liberal democracy to be found in, and now globally
propagated by, many donor countries.
Over the past two hundred years or so in continen-
tal Europe, struggles between contending religious,
social, political, economic and other groups led to
sophisticated configurations in terms of how a
social contract would be defined and enforced.
Germany's workers' representation in business gov-
ernance; a national Social Economic Council in the
Netherlands, with a statutory role in public policy
formulation and decision-making; joint manage-
ment by trade unions and employers of social secu-
rity funds in France; the tight interlocking of
political parties, government, banks and industry in
Japan; the appointment of Ombudsmen and
women to adjudicate on transactions between citi-
zen and state in many countries; are but some
examples of the evolution of social contract theory
into the complex institutional structures, norms
and practices of non-Anglo Saxon industrialised
societies.5
These arrangements reflect the fact that interests
can, indeed, be aligned as a 'partnership' between
contending groups and the power differences they
manifest. In other words, power realignment is pos-
sible, even in a zero sum game, because more pow-
erful parties see that it is in their overall interest to
accommodate others or face prolonged conflict
requiring ongoing repression that is inherently
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politically unstable and economically costly
Framed another way, such configurations are a pos-
itive product of an apparent paradox that 'social
conflict may be necessary for the stability of a
democratic society, and it is a vehicle for oppressed
groups to stimulate social change and to ensure
long-term social stability' (Gidron et al. 1999:276).
However, it must be remembered that this Western
evolution occurred in an era of closed markets and
limited cross-border investment. In other words, a
nation-state was a relatively self-contained entity
where stability required negotiation and accommo-
dation of enclosed diverse interests for the good of
everyone. This condition holds less and less true
today For example, capital can now move more
freely and quickly than labour. Government sole
control over domestic economic policy is being
eroded. Enhanced communication is allowing citi-
zens to see alternative ways of doing things and
organising for their common interests across bor-
ders. Sub-national ethnic groups are asserting their
identity, prevailing against the old consensus about
state formation and statesociety relations.
Together, these and other forces are conspiring
against the continuation of 'old style' social con-
tracts - beyond individual rights in a democracy -
as the basis of relationship between European states
and their citizens. One obvious consequence for
effective development work is to question the sense
of propagating such a theoretical foundation in the
South under very different global conditions.
Put another way Western experience indicates that
partnership as social contract is the product - under
a specific set of historical conditions - of internal,
iterative processes involving social assertion, con-
tention and resolution that eventually match and
balance forces and capacities leading to negotiated,
collaborative and stable power arrangements. It is
not something to be 'given' by existing power-hold-
ers or externally constructed by foreign finance.
Despite progress in economic liberalisation that
often differentially benefits transnational over local
corporations (Korten 1995), a predisposition
towards redistribution of political power away from
existing holders cannot be seen in many developing
countries - China being a foremost example,
Zimbabwe another. Without this precondition, to
establish effective partnerships, aid must generate
positive sum outcomes in power redistribution.
This is a stringent requirement that aid itself has so
far been unable to deliver, even by financing the
costs of empowerment', i.e., inducing and amelio-
rating a structural power transition from more to
less powerful groups, especially the poor and mar-
ginalised. Instead, aid is often used to retrench,
refine and solidify existing power relationships and
structures that maintain poverty and do not foster
economic growth (Mosley 1997, quoted in Abugre
1999:3; World Bank 1998).
In other words, the emphasis on partnership across
the aid system rests on a questionable axiom that
wilfully ignores donor countries' own history and
current conditions. Nevertheless, this eroding para-
digm is consciously chosen to inform todays official
development goals, priorities and methods. The
partnership idea applied to international aid envis-
ages establishing in the South a social contract
model of development previously prevailing in
many northern countries. In the model being prop-
agated, state, market and third sector actors can
apparently be persuaded or induced to perform in
consort. This is considered to be the best way of
overcoming the social and environmental dysfunc-
rions created by the limits to competition in a glob-
ally expanding capitalist market economy (Lisbon
Group 1995). The validity of this model rests on the
dubious assumption that the long, differentiated
evolutionary processes and struggles between con-
tending forces, which the North has undergone to
reach contemporary social contract arrangements,
can be circumvented by judicious application of
foreign funds within a uniform framework and in a
different era. Historical analysis of development
anywhere offers no confirmation that this assump-
tion holds true. In fact, the opposite appears to be
the case: namely, that development models, policies
and approaches need to be tailored 'to a country
moment in history Situational relativism must be
accepted by academic development economists as
well as by policy makers, both within developing
countries and in the inter-national development pol-
icy community' (Adleman and Morris 1997:840).
In other words, employing partnership to create
social contract arrangements everywhere will not be
the most appropriate way of bringing about struc-
tural change from the perspective of poverty
reduction. Contention is needed just as often as
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cooperation, if those who are poor and marginalised
are to have any hope of being heard and really lis-
tened to outside of aid inducement. Relying on
social contract theory to inform social change is just
too simplistic and ahistorical to be useful. In fact, as
we will see later, it can be a blinkering impediment
to effective and sustainable attainment of aid's overt
goals.
3.2 Partnership as a practical solution to
aid's failings
Charles Abugre provides a succinct summary of the
intended role of partnership in redressing the prob-
lems and pathologies (Fowler 2000b) of the aid
system.
The purpose of the 'partnership' framework is
to address what recent diagnoses of the aid
industry conclude are the critical gaps which
accounted in the past for the ineffectiveness of
aid. These are identified as: (1) the lack of local
'ownership' of policies and programmes, per-
ceived as the key to good management; (2)
inappropriate donor behaviour, including
[insufficienti aid co-ordination and the ineffec-
tiveness of conditionality as a surveillance and
quality control mechanism and; (3) the under-
lying environment, including the nature of poli-
cies, institutions and the political system.
Consequently, partnership seeks to address
inclusiveness, complementarity, dialogue and
shared responsibility as the basis of managing
the multiple relationships among stakeholders
in the aid industry
(Abugre 1999:2)
The role for partnership spelled out above is, to say
the least, daunting. As Abugre goes on to point out,
'it is an overstated ascription of what is possible
with the best of intentions' (Abugre 1999:2). This is
even more the case in the light of necessary precon-
ditions that are unlikely to exist in many countries.
But one example, common to sub-Saharan Africa, is
the lack of trust between rulers of (previously)
prebendel and rapacious states (Joseph 1983) and
the weak notions of citizenship and political iden-
tity beyond ethnic affiliation (Ayode 1988). Another
example is the closed and tightly (corruptly) inter-
locking economic and political power in many
developing countries.
In terms of promoting inclusiveness, partnership fos-
tered or forced though aid conditions must deal
with an important internal contradiction. On the
one hand, aid must respect the sovereignty of the
government it is dealing with, i.e., its right to deter-
mine its own process of public engagement, negoti-
ation and division of roles. On the other hand, the
aid system must push, pull, cajole, enable and
induce to the negotiating table (disempowered)
actors who might otherwise be excluded, poten-
tially undermining sovereign choice, organic politi-
cal processes and regime mandate. In other words,
it will weaken rather than reinforce local ownership
of and commitment to development action, which
is now considered to be a sine qua non for aid effec-
tiveness and sustainability of change (Wolfensohn
1999; World Bank 1998; Hudock in this volume).
Moreover, not all parties will have equal compe-
tence to engage, which often calls for prior 'capac-
ity-building' investment. This requires many years
and may be beyond the repertoire of aid tools
available.6
Lack of caution in dealing with this contradiction
by, for example, imposing inclusive conditions for
non-governmental, civic or business actors can
invite a government 'backlash', explained and fore-
seen by Aziz All Mohammed (1997) and examined
by Michael Bond (2000). For example, government
'partnership backlash' in Africa is a reasonable
interpretation of the fact that in April 2000, civic
groups were not allowed to congregate in Cairo
alongside the meeting between African heads of
state and ministers from countries of the European
Union. Despite some donor backing for a Cairo
venue, NGDOs had to hold their meeting in Lisbon,
seat of the country holding the EU chairmanship.
This illustrates that requiring or demanding 'part-
nership' can, in fact, be counterproductive.
Partnership as a path to greater coniplementañty pre-
sumes an optimum division of roles, responsibilities
and labour between different types of actors for eco-
nomic progress and social problem solving. The
legalistic 'tri-sectoral' view of institutional types
(Brown and Korten 1989; Salamon and Anheier
1999; Defourny and Delvetere 2000) posits that
northern configurations are closer to the optimum
than in the South. Partnership can supposedly help
move the South in the desired direction. Crudely
speaking, the typical assertion from the three-sector
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liberal economic and democratic theory and prac-
tice is that: (i) the for-profit sector innovates and
generates wealth and economic growth; (ii) govern-
ments set enabling conditions for business, police
the public good, regulate behaviour and maintain
stability, security and the value of money; (iii) the
third sector deals with and makes good state and
market failure experienced by different social
groups. However, this implicitly denies that the
third sector has intrinsic values, origins and func-
tions that have nothing to do with failure of states
or markets. For example, religion and spiritual val-
ues are not the province of state or market, nor are
identity-reinforcing ethnic or cultural associations
and their sustaining norms, myths and practices.
Put another way, the 'compensatory' sector is, in
fact, the repository of values and norms, some of
which society allows to be expressed through their
historically evolved expectations about and toler-
ance of state and market roles and behaviour. Other
non-economic or regulatory values, associations
and processes remain expressed by and within the
sector itself. The limitation of a three-sector view
becomes even clearer if the political concept of civil
society is employed instead.8
Civil society in its narrow Western theoretical
grounding is inherently about power relations
between state and citizens (van Rooy 1998). In lib-
eral interpretations, a fundamental task of civil soci-
ety is to constrain the natural tendency of
government to expand its sphere of influence,
resorting to civil disobedience in extreme cases. lt is
stretching the point to call this complementarity a
'partnership'. The relationship is essentially adver-
sarial, based amongst others on assertion of civic
rights and other forms of claim-making. Hence, the
aid system creates yet another contradiction by
putting much effort into building civil society while
expecting it to be a 'harmony model' social contract
partner at the same time. A more practical approach
is to recognise that there are areas and times for col-
laboration and for an adversarial position that
depend on the historical moment, issue and trajec-
tory of the society in question. It is simply wrong to
think that 'partnership as complementarity' applies
everywhere and always.
Finally, to make aid more effective, there is the
intention that partnership will foster dialogue and
shared responsibility. From the above arguments, this
may or may not be true. As with so much in devel-
opment, it depends. An important aspect of what it
depends on are known and trusted rules of the
game, institutions and places for dialogue and
transmittal of alternative ideas that seek public sup-
port. Here, the media, and access to information
more generally, are particularly important. From
this perspective, what is needed for greater dialogue
and allocating responsibility are not potentially co-
opting and homogenising partnerships but greater
pluralism in the sources and propagation of infor-
mation and ideas. This is not to deny that many
developing countries would benefit from the evolu-
tion of more places and conventions enabling dif-
ferent interests and groups to communicate and
exchange with each other. With care, international
aid can certainly help in this development.
However, whether the result of better dialogue is
partnership and shared responsibility or something
else, like more firmly entrenched positions and bet-
ter rights-based claim-making, remains open to
question.
3.3 Partnership as an aid to foreign
penetration
A third way of looking at the preference for part-
nership as the modality for pursuing the new aid
agenda is as an instrument for deeper, wider and
more effective penetration into a country's develop-
ment choices and path. In other words, 'partner-
ship' is a terminological Trojan Horse. There are two
aspects to this perspective. One is a response to
learning about the complexity of change. The other,
as a way to prop up an aid system under threat in
the North and the South, is to co-opt or sideline
potentially opposing ideas and forces that express
and propagate alternative views.
Thirty years of experience in international aid has
taught us just how complex and indeterminate the
process of change can be. No one party can be
relied on to make growth or poverty reduction a
reality Moreover, aid is just one - sometimes small
(India), sometimes large (Mozambique) - compo-
nent of the process. More humility, realism and
reflection on inadequate performance has led the
aid system to the reasonable conclusion that as
many actors and forces as possible must be brought
to bear on making a country more liveable for the
population as a whole and viable in a rapidly
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evolving world order. Hence the attraction of part-
nership. The core problem is that the structural
nature of poverty is not particularly amenable to
change using what aid has mainly had to offer:
time-bound programmes and projects. This reality
is one reason for the current attention to policy-
based assistance and comprehensive aid frame-
works.9
What such frameworks intend to do is supply and
apply a common format through which aid can
engage with almost every facet of change and
potential development actor simultaneously at mul-
tiple levels of social organisation. Partnership is a
necessary rubric to make this appear both
inevitable because of past experience and innocu-
ous in its intent. But is it? The answer is probably
not. Why? Because the supposed inclusiveness of
the term hides the shadow side of excluding other
ideas about change.'° lt is a more subtle form of
external power imposition, less amenable to resis-
tance (Lukes 1974). By appearing to be benign,
inclusive, open, all-embracing and harmonious,
partnership intrinsically precludes other interpreta-
tions of reality, options and choices without overtly
doing so. In sum, the selection and universal appli-
cation of partnership is a mystification and distrac-
tion that not only conditions the development
debate at the cost of alternatives, but legitimises
deep penetration of foreign concerns into domestic
processes, inviting perverse and negative reactions.
For example, one potential consequence is to:
turn government accountability on its head.
Governments have a duty to account to their
people first and foremost through their parlia-
ments and other mechanisms, quite indepen-
dently of their obligations to external parties.
Participation of external actors in this process
ought to be secondary and incidental as is obvi-
ously the case in the domestic policymaking
process of the donors themselves.
(Abugre 1999:18)
A secondary, but still strong, effect is to more com-
prehensively either bring in and co-opt, or push
away and negate, the agendas and concerns of other
actors. Actors may have different views on how, for
example, poverty can best be reduced and society
made more equitable and stable and change made
sustainable over what time scale and through which
path. Co-optation is a particularly important
element of today's official 'partnership' strategy
because aid is under threat." Consequently, as
many constituencies as possible must be mobilised
for its continuation. This is a specïal concern for the
Bretton Woods lnstitutions that, because of their
governmental ownership and governance, have no
direct public constituency to support their case and
therefore existence.'2 Hence the active engagement
with NGDOs and religious organisations in 'part-
nership' (see Hudock in this volume).
All in all, a case can be made for choosing a differ-
ent way of looking at the relationships needed to
make aid work better. What might they be?
14 Alternatives to partnership: what are
they and why are they necessary?
At least two alternatives offer themselves as a guid-
ing idea about preferred relationships in the aid sys-
tem. One is cooperation, the other is solidarity
However, both must based on the premise of inter-
dependence.
The old way of looking at aid was in terms of co-
operation (hence the 'C' in OECD). It has none of
the normative overload of partnership. There are
many, many ways of co-operating. The most appro-
priate way depends on the issue and interests at
hand, the capacity and power of actors involved
and the context. The fact that development cooper-
ation has turned out be a condition of northern
dominance and patrimony has to do with patholo-
gies introduced by its interpretation (Fowler
2000a), not with the concept as such. There is every
reason to retain cooperation but to make it actually
work in terms of the interest of the South, which is
in the interest of a globally interdependent North
(Edwards 1999). Whether the institutional reforms
required will actually make this happen before it is
too late is, however, open to doubt.
Another alternative is solidarity .- in other words, a
recognition of the inevitability of the need for
mutual understanding, empathy and shared action
in an increasingly interdependent and complicated
world. While more emotive and politically loaded
than 'co-operation', solidarity gets us closer to and
clearer about the moral underpinning that is sup-
posed to reflect international aid. It is a term that
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has motivated significant social reform and progres-
sive relationships between people. It is less
ambiguous in terms of what needs to be done rela-
tionally to bring about change (Abugre 1999:19).
What has been working against both of these
choices is the fact that the aid system does not actu-
ally behave as an interdependent system but as a
chain of dependency-inducing relationships (SIDA
1996). Each link in the chain maybe connected to,
but is protected from, the next by a sort of firewall,
which stops the heat of inadequate performance
from rising upwards and burning the real power
holders. Contracting out, projects externalised from
organisations that implement them, and lack of real
mutuality and shared accountability protect at each
link.'3 In other words, there is too little interdepen-
dency in terms of the consequences of aid built into
the rules of the game and practices flowing from
them. Unfortunately, the overall outcome is a loss of
the credibility of aid as a solution to problems of
poverty and injustice.
Consequently, a vital reason why we must seriously
reconsider the use of 'partnership' is that, as the
articles in this bulletin show, it can create a new
stick with which the aid system will be beaten. For
all the reasons given above, setting partnership and
all that it implies as the relational standard will, in
many instances, backfire. Non-delivery on the aspi-
rations of partnership will create even more dissat-
isfaction with aid as an effective means of making
the world work better for those who are losing out
on 'progress'. So, let us get real and honest about
what sort of relationships are desirable and possi-
ble. Business, government and organisations of civil
society do not pretend to be in partnership with all
those they relate to. There is no reason why the aid
system should make itself even more vulnerable by
doing so.
4 Development Partnership in
Practice: NGDO Experience
To be effective, NGDOs must make and maintain a
wide array of relationships and accountabilities
(Edwards and Hulme 1996). As intermediaries,
three are particularly significant. The first is the
relationship with those in whose name NGDOs
claim legitimacy and serve: people who are poor,
marginahsed and suffering from injustice. The
second is accountability to the public, predomi-
nantly through the government, understood as the
regime in power and the bureaucracy it controls.
The third are the supporters and private and public
funders of the work of NGDOs. The articles in this
issue of the IDS Bulletin describe this array of rela-
tional combinations NGDOs find themselves in.
4.1 The articles
First, Ann Hudock offers a broad-brush view of
NGDO interactions with official aid. Carmen
Malena details NGDO relations with the World
Bank, differentiating NGDO type and behaviour on
the basis of their purpose for wanting to engage
with this institution. Yonekura Yukiko provides a
country-specific comparison of NGDO relations
with a bilateral aid agency and between two inter-
national NGDOs, local NGDOs and grassroots
organisations in Cambodia. With post-Soviet
Georgia as the setting, Kate Hamilton analyses the
evolution of a new breed of domestic NGDOs and
their relationships with local people, official donors,
international NGDOs and the Georgian
Government. She identifies a paradox in a common
donor approach to partnership in transition
economies where early withdrawal is the explicit
strategy Finally, using four cases, Jethro Penit
describes the lessons learnt by one international
NGDO in its efforts to strengthen (and partner
with) grassroots organisations as a core programme
objective, rather than as a means to implement
projects.
In terms of NGDO relations with official donors, no
case approaching real partnership can be found.
However, as the contributions from Yonekura
Yukiko and Jethro Petttit show, the situation
appears more hopeful where the donor to an
NGDO is an NGDO itself. Ann Hudock's analysis
points to three quite deep reforms required in
donor behaviour if partnership is to become a real
relational prospect. Carmen Malena consciously
chooses not to use the term partnership in her
analysis of NGDO relations with the World Bank.
While missionary' NGDOs may be able to get
closer to negotiating a partnership-type relation-
ship, Bank procedures, differences in institutional
culture and the fact that the borrower government
must be involved, all act as impediments to making
this happen. Contracting becomes the most usual
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World Bank relationship with NGDOs and partici-
pation of beneficiaries in loan-based projects too
often lacks sufficient depth in terms of their owner-
ship and control to gain some degree of mutuality
Bilateral aid from Japan exhibits similar and addi-
tional constraints through overly centralised deci-
sion making, allied to an aversion to financing
greater local capacity that could create a more level
playing field in terms of capability to negotiate.
Moreover, in both cases donors are not inclined to
see the (local) organisation as opposed to the pro-
ject as a legitimate currency for discourse and inter-
vention (Holloway 1997).
The Georgia case shows the difficulty with, but
essential importance of, creating public credibility
and trust for a new type of non-profit organisation.
Difficulty in gaining such positive public recogni-
tion and understanding requires NGDOs not to
behave 'topdown' like the previous Soviet govern-
ment. Unfortunately, this too often occurs because
funding agendas and priorities - be they official or
INGDO - predominate local NGDOs' forms and
choices, impeding real popular participation. Kate
Hamilton analysis goes deeper into the way in
which external actors acculturate newly established
NGDOs in such a way as to preclude them even
thinking about a different way of being a non-profit,
civic organisation. She also highlights the fact that an
intention to leave as soon as possible works against
funder's own objective of creating a sustainable third
sector which requires a long-term commitment.
The situation between international and local
NGDOs and communities looks brighter in part-
nership terms, if (a) there is a sufficiently strong
shared value base, (b) the international NGDO is
prepared to have its behaviour validated by its local
counterparts, (c) is in for the long term and (d) sees
the organisation as where a relationship has to be
built, using projects as a means to this end. To dif-
ferent degrees, these preconditions are exhibited in
the Cambodian case and in three of World
Neighbours - Nepal, Mali and Haiti - described by
Jethro Penit. What all these cases show is also a
conscious investment in the funders' own organisa-
tional capacity to be a partner not just a project
financier. This commonly involves a change in
human skills, internal procedures and measures for
achievement, and greater agility and flexibility to
act.
In all cases, these requirements are enabled by
strategic thinking and a sufficient degree of deci-
sion-making authority accorded to the staff on the
ground. Delegation of authority is vital if substantial
organisation-to-organisation relations are to be built
up as the necessary foundation to get anywhere
near authentic partnership as described above
(bowler 2000c). The professional skill required is to
do this in such a way that dependency is not a bi-
product. This implies thinking in situation-specific
and systemic terms.
In addition to the more detailed findings presented
in the following articles, what broader lessons can
be drawn from NGDO experience and practice?
4.2 The lessons
The following features contribute to forming some-
thing akin to authentic partnership for NGDOs.
Be clear about why? Only start a relationship if you
are clear about why you want it and what you real-
istically can and cannot put into it. Not achieving a
partnership is no failure, As in any other field of life,
to be effective the aid system requires a variety of
relationships tailored to the actors and their inter-
ests, capabilities and purposes. Clarity means hon-
esty about how you can relate. It prevents later
accusations of failing to be a partner, with the frus-
tration and loss of credibility that this can engender.
In short, do not provide the stick with which you
will be beaten.
Apply the principle of interdependence. To be authen-
tic, partnership cannot be an 'add-on'. It must be an
intrinsic feature of organisational perspective and
behaviour, premised on interdependence with oth-
ers in a complex, dynamic world. If, as a donor and
more powerful party, you are not really dependent on
the behaviour of your counterpart for your own
credibility and viability, you have probably not
moved from dependency and patronage.
Adopt a contextual, systems approach and perspective.
Do not look at your relationship(s) in isolation from
others that you and your counterpart have now and
will need to have to be sustainable in the future.
Strive for a systemic view of change and the place of
your relationship within it.
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Adopt an organísational not project focus. Partnership
is about gaining a deep organisational relationship,
which is not a 'project'. Look at a project as a
vehicle to explore relationships, not as the basis of
them. In doing this, the longer term perspective is
to help both parties develop the capability to
analyse effectively and address unforeseen problems
that will arise in the future, not just in the immedi-
ate context of a project'4 - in other words, a case
where 'partnership' makes each organisation more
agile and adaptive.
Create a process for local validation and shared control.
Work against the power asymmetry inherent in aid
relationships by establishing joint processes and
structures that do produce mutuality and shared
control,
loves t in your own reform. Partnership is a two-way,
not a one-way process. For donors, it calls for prior
investment to set up the internal conditions
required to share rather than retain control and to
aid the weaker party to become strong enough to
move from (inevitable) initial dependency through
independence to self-chosen interdependence
(Kaplan 1996).
Employ the achievement of downward accountability as
proxy for partnership. Increasing the amount of offi-
cial or tax-based aid to NGDOs brings a relational
problem in terms of gaining or retaining 'downward
accountability', to those legitimising the Organisa-
tion's existence. 1f you cannot demonstrate the ways
in which you are held accountable from below for
what you do and say, then authentic partnership is
unlikely to be present. Downward accountability is
a fair proxy for evaluating progress in creating part-
nership-type relationships.
The quest for partnership can be interpreted as part
of a struggle to change the way the aid system oper-
ates in order to regain its credibility However, this
type of relationship is not always appropriate, desir-
able or realistically possible. Consequently, far more
care needs to be exercised in the use of the term to
prevent abuse creating greater mistrust. The pri-
mary abuse lies in 'partnership', disguising the fact
that power differences exist and that the poverty
and injustice this causes are unlikely to be harmo-
niously eradicated.
Notes
There is no commonly accepted definition of
NGDOs. For the purpose of this bulletin, they can be
regarded as third-party serving, non-profit based,
legally constituted non-state organisations, directly or
indirectly reliant on the system of international aid.
In most cases, they function as intermediaries to pro-
mote poverty eradication, sustainable development,
social justice and enduring improvement in the cir-
cumstances of poor and excluded groups. In fewer
cases, they concentrate on advocacy work for policy
reform. They number in the tens of thousands world-
wide. In this volume, the acronyms NGO and NGDO
are equivalent and simply reflect authors' prefer-
ences.
2 The North is understood as those countries donating
aid, the South as those countries receiving aid.
3 1 am grateful to Dorothy Gordon for this observation.
4 The other two sectors in society sectors are govern-
ment and for-profit business. As predominantly
defined (Salamon and Anheier 1997) the non-profit
third sector does not equate with civil society
because, amongst others, it does not include non-for-
mal associational life, giving preference to bodies
with a legal personality In this article, the more inclu-
sive concept of civil society is employed.
5 The United States and Great Britain (after the fall of
the Labour Party in the seventies) have been less dis-
posed to embrace social contracts in the form of
sophisticated institutional arrangements for multi-
stakeholder negotiation and dialogue. A speculation
would be that the nature of two-party as opposed to
coalition politics common in continental Europe has
mitigated against this type of consensual evolution.
6 Institutional development and capacity building are
now significant elements of the new aid agenda.
However, the system is finding it particularly difficult
to achieve this, in part because it requires reforms
within itself to give more power away to more com-
petent local actors.
7 Part of the 'backlash' stems from an overstated but
not completely illegitimate concern about the legiti-
macy, mandate and accountability of NGDO activists
who lobby for policy change (Jordan and van Tuijl
1997). This criticism often comes from regimes
whose own legitimacy can be questioned.
11
8 In terms of explaining the existence of a third sector,
the latest contender is more historical, relying on
diversity in social history (Salamon and Anheier
1998).
9 For example, the World Bank is championing a
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF),
while the United Nations System is relying on
Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF).
10 Noam Chomsky has demonstrated how control over
language controls thought and interpretation of real-
ity. This holds true in the aid system as well, to be
seen, for example, in official definitions of develop-
ment, needs, participation, empowerment, sustain-
ability, etc. (Sachs 1992).
11 The counter argument is that, in accepting engage-
ment, NGDOs seek to co-opt government. The weak-
ness of this argument increases as NGDOs become
more and more dependent on official aid. It is more
difficult to alter the behaviour of those who feed you
and NGDOs are not renowned for hunger strikes, In
this light, non-aid related social movements might be
a better bet in terms of changing the system.
12 For example, it is particularly interesting to learn that
the IMF is, in fact, an anti-poverty institution, albeit
full to the brim with macro-economists. I, and many
others, have lived with the 'obvious' misapprehension
that the IMPs role was to ensure global economic sta-
bility and efficiency! A not implausible interpretation
is that the IMF is adopting anti-poverty clothing and
language as a defensive response against threat from,
for example, the US Congress. The Meltzer
Committee recently argued for a significant reduction
in the scope of IMP engagement and concentration
on financial stability (The Economist, March 18, 2000:
88). The Overseas Development Council (ODC
2000) acknowledges the impact of IMF behaviour on
poverty but also argues that the Fund role be
restricted and that the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) be transferred to the World Bank.
13 For example, how can the World Bank make good
erroneous policy 'advice' that generates enormous
social costs, such as unemployment and collapse of
whole industry (Hanlon 1997).
14 I am grateful to Jethro Pettit for this observation.
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